Exclusive Report by Kurdpa: How Do People View the Iran-Israel War? The Regime's Disregard for Civilian Lives, Widespread Hope for Regime Collapse, Discrediting of State Media, and Intensified Security Atmosphere in Kurdish Cities

On June 16, 2025, Kurdpa published an exclusive report compiling the narratives and observations of 14 active and concerned citizens from nine cities in Iranian Kurdistan. The findings indicate a complete absence of the government in fulfilling its basic responsibilities during a time of crisis, along with a sharp rise in public hope for the end of the Islamic Republic.

• 100% of respondents confirmed that no sirens, public announcements, or official warnings were issued to protect civilians.
• 93% reported that no training or shelters were available.
• 86% stated they received information solely from foreign media, social networks, or local sources, and described state media as lacking credibility.

Overall, more than 90% of participants reported an intensified security atmosphere, the presence of overt or implied threats, and simultaneous hope for the weakening or collapse of the regime.

This report is based on the responses of 14 active, observant, and concerned citizens from nine cities in Iranian Kurdistan (Sanandaj, Saqqez, Marivan, Baneh, Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Ilam, Urmia, and Kermanshah). The survey was distributed on the third day of the military confrontation between the Islamic Republic and Israel and collected on the fourth day. Narratives are provided directly by individuals who personally witnessed events and the public atmosphere in their cities. This report first presents a general overview of the key statistical findings and then offers a detailed analysis of the responses in each category, including frequency percentages and qualitative insights. The goal of this analysis is to convey the unfiltered voice of Kurdish citizens during a crisis and to assess the government’s neglected responsibilities toward the safety and security of civilians.

Although the responses were given in the form of 13 distinct questions and are analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively in the following sections, this portion presents a condensed overview of the most significant findings based on the responses of 14 citizens from nine Kurdish cities. This summary provides a snapshot of public sentiment on the war, government conduct, and political outlook.

• 100% confirmed that no alarms, announcements, or official training were issued by the government to prepare for drone or missile strikes.
• 93% stated there were no clear instructions or designated shelters for protecting civilians.
• 79% believed that civilian lives are of no concern to the government, which prioritizes officials and state institutions.
• 86% reported receiving news from foreign media, social networks, or grassroots sources, and deemed state media untrustworthy.
• Over 90% of responses expressed hope for the weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic and psychological readiness to protest if conflict continues.
• None of the respondents reported direct attacks on civilian areas or casualties in their neighborhoods; however, the proximity of residential areas to military bases was cited as a serious concern.
• The vast majority described an intensely securitized environment in their cities, with reports of threatening messages, checkpoints, and both formal and informal warnings regarding social media activity.
• At least half of the responses indicated that any positive expression regarding attacks on regime targets—even in the form of stories, jokes, or posts—posed a risk of prosecution.
• Despite this atmosphere, a high level of social solidarity, hope, and psychological readiness for protest or organized resistance among the population was evident.

 

Disaggregated Analysis of Responses:

This section analyzes each of the 13 posed questions individually. The focus lies on statistical distributions, notable quotations, and human rights interpretations. The goal is to not only provide a statistical overview of the responses but also to reflect the underlying meanings and lived realities of the respondents.

1. During the recent drone and missile attacks in various parts of Iran, did government authorities issue any public warnings, official announcements, or emergency sirens?

All respondents (100% of the 14 participants) unequivocally stated that no official warnings, government-issued announcements, or sirens were issued at the time of the attacks or even afterward. In Oshnavieh, respondents noted that not only were sirens not activated, but military forces dressed in civilian clothing had militarized the city.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “There was no information dissemination or siren at all.”
2. From Saqqez: “No, not at all. There were no alerts or alarms.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “Not only were no alarms activated, but military personnel in plainclothes militarized the city.”
4. From Ilam: “Only after the missile was fired did we hear the fire trucks. There was no communication or preparedness.”
5. From Kermanshah: “I don’t have Iranian TV, but I didn’t hear anything even on domestic messaging platforms.”
6. From Sanandaj: “No, absolutely no warning or announcement was seen.”
7. From Piranshahr: “No sirens were sounded and no guidance or instructions for sheltering were issued.”

Field reports from nine cities across Kurdistan show that the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to activate any formal public alert mechanism to protect civilians during the recent missile or drone strikes. This inaction contradicts the principles of international humanitarian law and recognized standards for civilian protection during armed conflict, including:

• The obligation to provide advance warning to civilian populations (as outlined in Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions)
• The right to access life-saving information (according to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

Residents of cities near military targets or garrisons found themselves in danger without receiving any instructions from the state.

 

2. When explosions were heard, did you know what to do? Had the government provided any prior training or instructions on how to shelter or protect civilians?

All 14 respondents (100%) reported that there had been no training, announcements, or preparedness measures issued by the government for responding to airstrikes, missile attacks, or defense scenarios.

Three individuals stated that they had some limited personal knowledge based on past experiences—such as Red Crescent training or family stories from the Iran-Iraq war—but this was not government-provided and was scattered in nature.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “Some foreign media outlets provided information, but the government and relevant institutions said nothing.”
2. From Kermanshah: “When I heard the explosion, I didn’t know where a safe place was… I was stunned, screaming with my little child in my arms.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “I don’t think there are any shelters in any Kurdish city… People are only somewhat familiar with this due to historical experiences.”
4. From Saqqez: “Just a few Instagram bloggers posted some tips in their stories, that’s all.”
5. From Ilam: “I once took a Red Crescent course; I remember a few things. But from the government? Nothing at all.”
6. From Piranshahr: “No guidance or instructions for sheltering were issued.”

These responses indicate that the Islamic Republic of Iran not only lacks any collective emergency warning system but also failed to take even the most basic educational or preparatory steps to safeguard civilians during military attacks. This absence constitutes a serious violation of fundamental state responsibilities during crises:

According to Article 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states are obligated to protect the lives of their citizens during life-threatening situations.

Under international humanitarian standards, advance warnings, sheltering education, and emergency infrastructure for civilians are non-derogable duties of states—even in wartime.

 

3. During the recent attacks, were civilian areas such as residential homes, schools, medical centers, or public spaces targeted? Did you or those around you witness any harm to civilians (either in lives or property)?

Out of 14 respondents:

• 9 said that only military, security, or governmental facilities were targeted. They reported no direct attacks on residential or public areas.
• 2 noted that in some locations, secondary damage or shrapnel impacted homes or civilian infrastructure, though not as direct targets.
• 3 respondents (22%) said they had no information or had not directly witnessed any damage.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “Only military sites were targeted, and no damage occurred elsewhere.”
2. From Oshnavieh: “Neighborhoods and homes near military bases are under stress due to risk of damage, but we haven’t seen any yet.”
3. From Kermanshah: “Friends said their water, electricity, and gas were cut and windows shattered—mainly from the blast wave, not a direct hit.”
4. From Saqqez: “According to what I’ve heard, military sites or a refinery were targeted; if any residential places were hit, it’s because they belonged to IRGC members.”
5. From Baneh: “No residential or civilian sites were attacked.”

Based on field reports from nine cities, there is no conclusive or documented evidence of direct targeting of civilian areas so far. The reported targets include IRGC bases, defense installations, or government buildings. However, many citizens expressed serious fear of collateral damage, blast effects, or shrapnel, particularly due to the presence of armed forces within or near urban or semi-residential zones—posing additional risks to civilians.

Under international humanitarian law, the government has the duty to:

• Keep military bases away from densely populated areas;
• Refrain from positioning military forces near civilian zones during conflict;
• Take all necessary measures to minimize incidental harm to civilians (in accordance with the principle of distinction in the law of armed conflict).

This responsibility applies not only to the attacking party, but critically to the government whose population is at risk.

 

4. Through which sources do you primarily follow news and information about the conflict? (Iranian state media, foreign media, social networks, messaging platforms, grassroots sources) Why did you choose this source?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 9 stated that foreign media outlets—especially Iran International and Rudaw—were their main sources of news.
• 10 emphasized that they primarily follow social networks and messaging platforms (Telegram, Instagram, WhatsApp).
• Only 1 person mentioned turning to state media like IRIB in case of an internet shutdown.
• 1 respondent said they monitor both state and foreign media but added that most people rely on Telegram (response from Marivan).

Notably, nearly all emphasized their lack of trust in domestic media. Their choice of alternative sources was due to transparency, lack of censorship, availability of citizen-generated videos, and relative neutrality.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “We monitor both state and non-state media. But most people rely on Telegram.”
2. From Saqqez: “Iran International, because it’s clearer and shows people’s videos without censorship; Rudaw because it’s more neutral.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “Independent news channels and social media are our sources.”
4. From Ilam: “When I’m home, I watch Iran International and follow the rest of the news via Telegram.”
5. From Saqqez: “If the internet is cut, we only have access to Iran International and Rudaw because they have wide coverage.”
6. From Urmia: “Due to limited access tools, I follow the news on social media and from various sources.”

Field data analysis reveals that independent foreign media and social networks are the two dominant—and nearly exclusive—sources people use to access real information about the ongoing war. This is because of:

• Complete distrust in state media;
• Official censorship, manipulation, and propaganda;
• The need for fast, unfiltered, and visual coverage of events.

In regions like Kurdistan, people with high awareness try to cross-reference diverse sources to get closer to the truth. This tendency stems from the lack of a free press and restricted access to open information in Iran—an explicit violation of:

• Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
• Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning freedom of access to information.

5. What are people saying about the war in the streets and public spaces? Is the general atmosphere in your city shaped more by anxiety, indifference, anger, or solidarity?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 8 described the public as eager for the regime’s end, expressing happiness, solidarity, or motivation for change triggered by the attacks.
• 5 reported that fear dominated and that people were preparing for emergencies—stocking essentials or fleeing to villages.
• 2 described a layered emotional state among the public, mixing fear with conditional hope.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “People in Kurdistan are very worried that the war will cost the Kurds dearly. But many also say these are the final moments of the Islamic Republic.”
2. From Saqqez: “Most people are happy, seeing the attacks as a result of the regime’s provocative policies.”
3. From Kermanshah: “People are really scared… Most have prepared basic supplies in case something happens, planning to flee to nearby villages.”
4. From Oshnavieh: “Not much at first, but by day three—now that the targets are more serious—people’s stress levels have risen.”
5. From Saqqez (another): “People are happy if the war leads to regime change, and there’s solidarity.”
6. From Urmia: “Overall, people in the streets aren’t in favor of war breaking out.”
7. From Ilam: “Mostly indifferent, no serious hope, no public reaction.”

The responses illustrate a complex and layered public sentiment in Kurdistan:

On one hand, there is widespread hope for the weakening or collapse of the regime, particularly in cities with a history of civil resistance.

On the other hand, bitter memories of the Iran-Iraq war, bloody crackdowns, and past instability foster a deep fear of the human, economic, and security costs of prolonged conflict.

Some also express ethnonational concerns, fearing that Kurdistan could be sacrificed as a human shield or retaliatory target by the Islamic Republic.

This duality—hope for liberation alongside fear of devastation—is a hallmark of chronic political pressure in a society that, despite widespread dissatisfaction, still lacks a safe framework for collective action.

 

6. Have you received, or heard of others receiving, messages from security agencies containing threats, warnings, or prohibitions against protesting the war or criticizing the government?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 6 individuals reported personally receiving or knowing someone who received threatening or warning messages.
• 5 stated that such warnings were issued publicly or propagandistically (e.g., via SMS, state-run media, or government ads), though they were not directly targeted themselves.
• 3 said they had seen or heard no such threats or warnings.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “These days, there’s a lot of talk that if someone criticizes the government, expresses joy over the war, or goes near military sites, they’ll be treated like a traitor and face severe punishment.”
2. From Sanandaj: “On Saturday, I received a message from the Kurdistan Judiciary’s Social Harms Department criminalizing activity on social media related to the war.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “We were told to avoid jokes, satire, or cheerful content. They even said it’s better to say ‘I don’t know’ when asked political questions.”
4. From Saqqez: “They send propaganda messages like ‘we protect the people’ and ‘we didn’t start the war, but we’ll end it.’”
5. From Urmia: “Public messages were broadcast through media, and some media outlets were also given phone warnings.”

The responses reveal that even in the absence of widespread arrests, a tangible atmosphere of psychological threat and repression prevails. Three layers of this repression have been identified:

1. Direct and official threats: Warning messages from security or judicial bodies directed at active or observant individuals.
2. Psychological and public propaganda repression: Messaging via state media, SMS, and official platforms portraying dissent as “treason.”
3. Informal societal threats: A local atmosphere where any dissenting opinion, joy, or behavior misaligned with official narratives could be treated as a “security offense.”

These practices represent a clear violation of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding freedom of expression and the principle of non-punishment for peaceful opinion. Framing even simple emotions as “treason” indicates a regime that substitutes legitimacy with fear and coercion.

 

7. Have you witnessed the arrest, summons, or threat of individuals for expressing opinions, posting on social media, or participating in gatherings related to the conflict? What form have these reactions taken?

Out of the 14 respondents:

• 10 reported that they had not directly witnessed any arrests, summonses, or explicit threats so far. However, some of them pointed to a heavy security atmosphere, general alert status, and preemptive enforcement actions.
• 4 mentioned indirect reports of threats, surveillance, or arrests in other cities (e.g., Tehran or Kerman), or noted phone or propaganda warnings, though not in their own localities.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “A general security-heavy atmosphere dominates the city and its people.”
2. From Saqqez: “In Tehran and Kerman, people were arrested for expressing joy over Israel’s successes.”
3. From Sanandaj: “Two of my friends received threatening messages regarding their social media activity.”
4. From Oshnavieh: “Even minimal criticism of the government results in being labeled a traitor and facing harsh punishment.”
5. From other cities: None reported official arrests or summonses in their own towns, but all confirmed a strong deterrent and readiness posture.

While no physical arrests or summonses have been directly observed, nearly all respondents referred to the visible presence of security forces, a suppressive atmosphere, indirect threats, and extensive surveillance of public and online activity. This reflects a clear example of “preventive repression” or informal securitization aimed at silencing potential protests and controlling public opinion without officially declaring a state of emergency.

The key point is that the absence of arrests does not indicate an absence of repression; rather, its nature has shifted toward more covert and psychological methods.

 

8. In your opinion, how do citizens interpret this war? As legitimate national defense, a power-driven conflict by the Islamic Republic, an opportunity to weaken the regime, or a serious threat to national security?

Among the 14 respondents, public interpretations of the war fall into the following categories:

• 10 view it as an opportunity to weaken or overthrow the Islamic Republic.
• 4 consider it a power-driven conflict initiated by the regime, unrelated to national defense.
• None identified the war as a clear threat to national security posed by an external enemy.

Key Observation: Even among those who expressed concern about the war, most respondents attributed its origin to the Islamic Republic’s aggressive policies rather than foreign hostility.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “Most people say it’s about weakening the regime and toppling the government.”
2. From Saqqez: “The Kurdish people see this war as weakening the regime.”
3. From Kermanshah: “A power struggle by the Islamic Republic and a chance to undermine it.”
4. From Oshnavieh: “They’re glad the killers of their children are finally facing consequences.”
5. From Urmia: “Ordinary citizens fear this could be the beginning of a Syrian-like collapse in Iran.”

The analysis suggests that the public sees the conflict as a direct result of the regime’s belligerent policies and its instrumentalization of civilians as human shields. Among the responses, there is a tone of strategic—though somber—optimism: a hope that the regime may weaken, but without illusions about an easy or cost-free outcome.

These findings directly contradict the official narrative of a “national consensus against a foreign enemy,” highlighting the deep disconnect between state propaganda and public experience.

 

9. Do you think public protests within the country will increase or decrease if the war continues? Are people more inclined toward resistance, migration, or silence?

Among the 14 respondents, answers to this question fell into three primary trends:

• 7 believed that if the war continues, public protests will increase. They argued that the weakening of military and security structures would create space for uprisings or widespread rebellion.
• 4 pointed to a growing inclination toward migration, especially among the middle class or residents of central cities.
• 3 suggested that society might drift toward silence or temporary inaction—either due to fear of repression or the absence of cohesion and leadership.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “If military centers are destroyed or weakened, it’s very likely people will rise up and take power. In Kurdistan, Kurdish parties might return.”
2. From Saqqez: “Public protests will grow. People will be compelled to resist in order to establish a democratic government.”
3. From Kermanshah: “Both migration and public protests will rise.”
4. From Oshnavieh: “If the war continues and the regime weakens, people will take to the streets. There’s even potential for the return of Kurdish political forces.”
5. From Sanandaj and Urmia: “Silence will prevail; people are waiting for the larger cities to take the lead.”

These responses indicate that among politically aware and active citizens, the dominant view is that “protest space will open up due to military weakening.” However, the variation in responses reflects three key influencing factors:

• The intensity and duration of the war
• The degree of collapse in the security apparatus
• The presence—or absence—of a coherent political leadership or organizing force

In the Kurdistan region, the potential return of Kurdish parties to the political or social arena stands out as a prominent scenario in public imagination—signaling a latent readiness for structural transformation.

From a human rights perspective, it’s important to emphasize that inclinations toward protest, migration, or silence stem directly from the absence of safety, political participation, and freedom of expression—not from free choice in a democratic system.

 

10. In your view, do citizens now feel hopeful about the weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic, or do they believe the war will lead to increased securitization and tighter control?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 9 explicitly expressed hope that the war would result in the weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic.
• 3 considered both possibilities—hope for regime collapse alongside fear of intensified repression.
• 2 warned that the regime might use the war as a pretext to increase crackdowns and securitization.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “People are witnessing the regime’s gradual weakening.”
2. From Sanandaj: “People are hopeful for its collapse, like in Libya, Iraq, or Syria.”
3. From Baneh: “People are happy about the regime’s weakness and potential downfall.”
4. From Saqqez: “People believe this war will first weaken, then bring down the regime.”
5. From Oshnavieh: “The regime’s aura has faded; only the absence of coherent leadership has prolonged the protests.”
6. From Ilam and Urmia: Both warned that while the regime is weakening, it may simultaneously intensify surveillance and repression.

Hope for the weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic has become a central theme in the public consciousness during wartime—not out of mere emotion, but based on a sober analysis of the regime’s declining political and security authority. Respondents repeatedly used phrases such as “the dictator’s final moments,” “a historic opportunity,” or drew parallels to the fall of other authoritarian regimes like those in Libya, Iraq, and Syria.

Yet fears of increased securitization were also present, particularly from those with firsthand experience of repression, surveillance, and policing.

From a human rights perspective, this duality reveals a volatile and highly fluid societal state—where both democratic transition and intensified repression remain simultaneously possible.

 

11. In your city or province, has access to airports, bus terminals, or land borders for leaving the country become more restricted, controlled, or difficult than usual? Have people experienced problems trying to leave the country?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 5 reported increased restrictions on exit routes or heightened control over borders and roads, including checkpoints and targeted limitations for specific vehicles or IDs.
• 6 said they had no information or direct connection to this issue.
• 3 noted that while land borders remain open, airports and air routes have been closed or have become very difficult to access.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “Only land borders are open; air borders have been shut down.”
2. From Ilam: “Access has become more difficult—even private transport fares have gone up a lot.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “All entry and exit movements are heavily monitored.”
4. From Baneh: “No one has fled or left Kurdistan.”
5. From Urmia: “The Iraq border functions as usual, but the Turkish border is open only to those with residence permits or flight tickets.”

While no total shutdown has been reported, field observations indicate that the Islamic Republic is deliberately and semi-covertly restricting exit routes from the country—particularly in border regions of Kurdistan and neighboring provinces near Iraq, Turkey, and the Kurdistan Region.

Common Patterns in the Responses:

• Land borders remain semi-functional but are under heavy surveillance and control.
• Air travel is effectively blocked or inaccessible, especially for citizens lacking special permits or financial means.
• Many people cited high transportation costs, frequent checkpoints, or psychological stress from route surveillance as the main obstacles to leaving.

From a human rights perspective, restricting the right to leave a country during a crisis violates the principle of freedom of movement and the right to flee danger—especially when such restrictions are enforced with racial, economic, or regional discrimination.

 

12. In the event of an explosion or attack, how do you usually find out first? Through local messages, Telegram or WhatsApp channels, domestic or foreign media, or some other way?

Among the 14 respondents:

• 9 stated that social messaging platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp are their primary sources of immediate information—especially local groups and channels that rapidly disseminate breaking news.
• 3 said they initially heard explosions or witnessed scenes directly and then followed up through media or messaging platforms.
• 2 mentioned that Persian-language foreign media, such as Iran International or Rudaw, were their first sources of information.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “Telegram—because news spreads among the people in real time.”
2. From Saqqez and Baneh: “First we hear the sound of defense systems or explosions, then follow the news on Telegram.”
3. From Ilam and Kermanshah: “Telegram and Instagram, then the sound of explosions or messages from people.”
4. From Urmia: “I monitor the news across various social media platforms.”

The data clearly show that Telegram has become the most vital tool for real-time crisis communication. Official domestic networks play virtually no meaningful role in emergency alerting, and even professional foreign media serve as secondary sources of awareness.

This pattern starkly illustrates that in the absence of formal emergency alert and communication infrastructure, people have turned to grassroots, self-organized, and digital networks for life-saving information.

From a human rights standpoint, this situation reflects a serious failure by state institutions to maintain public warning mechanisms—leaving civilians to rely on informal systems for protection during high-risk events.

 

13. Overall, do you feel the Islamic Republic has fulfilled its duties to protect civilian lives under these circumstances? Why or why not? If you have an example, please share it.

Among the 14 respondents:

• 11 stated that the Islamic Republic has taken no meaningful action to protect civilians and does not even recognize such a responsibility.
• 2 said the government only protects the families of military personnel or officials—not ordinary people.
• 1 respondent vaguely said “yes, the government tries,” but immediately added, “only a few can leave, and the rest must suffer the consequences”—itself an indicator of structural discrimination.

Selected Accounts:

1. From Marivan: “The IRGC’s main goal is to protect specific people and places; the public is not a priority.”
2. From Sanandaj: “In recent days, no city has heard a siren. Air defenses only activated from the second day—practically useless.”
3. From Oshnavieh: “The regime denies even the most basic civil rights, especially for marginalized ethnic groups. People’s lives and property mean nothing to the system.”
4. From Ilam: “They have no plan. They only promote slogans like ‘Don’t cheer the enemy.’”
5. From Saqqez: “The Islamic Republic has never felt responsible for civilian lives. The past 40 years are proof of that.”
6. From Baneh: “The Islamic Republic has been the enemy of Kurdistan’s people, not their protector.”

The field responses converge on a unanimous conclusion: from the public’s perspective, the Islamic Republic has not only neglected its duty to protect civilians but has in effect sacrificed their safety to military and propaganda priorities. Many pointed out that not a single shelter exists in the cities, no warning sirens were sounded, and the regime focuses only on securing security agencies and the families of its personnel.

This deep gap in governmental responsibility—especially in underprivileged and minority regions like Kurdistan—represents a blatant violation of the right to life and the principle of non-discrimination as defined in international human rights law.

 

Final Note:

This field report was compiled during the third and fourth days of the military conflict between the Islamic Republic and Israel, based on the responses of 14 engaged and observant citizens from nine cities across Iranian Kurdistan. While this survey does not claim to represent the entirety of public opinion in Kurdistan or Iran, it provides a clear and detailed snapshot of the views held by a segment of the population that is informed, concerned, and directly affected by current events.

Naturally, public sentiments may evolve in the days and weeks ahead, depending on the intensity of the conflict, the government’s responses, and broader socio-political developments. This report captures a specific moment in time, and follow-up surveys and supplementary reports will be essential for gathering updated and more nuanced narratives.

 

Prepared by: Awin Mostafazadeh