Nothing Inevitable About War With Iran
13:29 - 27 February 2012
Sometime in the next few months, Israel may very well go to war against Iran, and it could draw the United States into the conflict. The global strategy firm Wikistrat, at which I am a senior analyst, recently laid out 10 scenarios for such a war breaking out, each plausible in its own way. Thomas P.M. Barnett wrote in a recent WPR column that he believes that war is inevitable, and even war opponents such as Peter Beinart and Bernard Finel believe that the “Iran hawks” have taken control of the debate.
The case for attacking Iran relies overwhelmingly on the concept of uncertainty. We don’t know if the Iranians want to build a bomb, or whether they can build a bomb, or when they might be able to build a bomb. Even if they build one, the consequences will remain unpredictable, because we don’t know what they would do with a bomb, or how their neighbors would react to an Iranian bomb. The deterrent effect of an Iranian nuclear weapon might prevent us from seeking regime change or some other aggressive military option, thus creating even more uncertainty. Containment might be possible, but the costs could be high and much would remain out of U.S. control.
It’s understandable how so much uncertainty can trigger anxiety. What is less clear is how we arrived at the notion that airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear program can eliminate this uncertainty. Prospects for success of an Israeli strike remain iffy, and U.S. estimates suggest that an attack would only briefly delay Iran’s nuclear program. Indeed, it\'s difficult to say what precisely would count as \"success\" or how the Israelis would measure the effectiveness of their attack. Tehran would certainly declare victory as soon as the last Israeli aircraft left its airspace, and the Iranians would control public assessment of the damage to their nuclear facilities.
Moreover, an Israeli strike on Iran, or a joint U.S.-Israeli strike, would hardly disarm the Islamic Republic. And once started, the war would end according to Tehran’s timetable, as Israel lacks the capability, and the United States the will or interest, to conquer Iran and replace the current regime. It is not certain that the regime of economic sanctions targeting Iran would break in case of an attack, but it’s certainly possible. Similarly, it’s not certain that Russia and China would become more forthcoming with military assistance to Tehran, but that, too, is certainly possible.
Most worrisome would be the prospect for the United States to be drawn into a war that it doesn’t want. Theoretically, the U.S. could wash its hands of an Israeli attack or adopt a stance of \"benevolent neutrality.\" However, the political costs of allowing Israel to absorb subsequent Iranian ripostes without coming to her aid might be too high to bear in an election year.
In short, an attack does nothing whatsoever to remedy uncertainty over the future of the Islamic Republic. Rather, on almost every available metric, an attack would enhance uncertainty, leaving all the players with less of a handle on the situation than they had before. Even if Israel and the United States eventually embrace “regime change” through airstrikes against Iranian government targets, the length, timing and extent of such a campaign could easily spiral out of control.
Right now, Iran is in a vise. Neither Russia nor China seems likely to expend much effort to support Tehran, and Europe appears ever more willing to commit to a robust sanctions program. Iran’s chief ally in the Middle East, Syria, is in the midst of a revolution. In conventional military terms, Iran is deeply inferior to its regional competitors and appears to be in the process of falling even farther behind. The Iranian defense budget amounts to roughly 60 percent of Israel’s, 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s, and 1 percent of America’s. Iran has displayed little ability to counter the strength of this undeclared trilateral coalition or to control regional events in any meaningful way.
In other words, war is not inevitable. Key people can still say no, with U.S. President Barack Obama being the most important among them. For now, the Obama administration seems to believe that pro-war rhetoric is manageable, and that it can tack between the demands of the Israeli government, the sanctions coalition and the presidential candidates of the Republican Party. This process involves pushing back against the idea that an immediate attack is necessary, while reaffirming the general idea that Iran represents a major threat to the United States.
As a political strategy, this may be viable. It runs the risk, however, of creating a rhetorical trap for the Obama administration. At some point, it may be hard for Obama to step down from the idea that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable and worth a war to prevent. In that case, saying no may become too politically difficult for the president. The task for hawks, whether in the United States or Israel, will be to draw this box as tightly and narrowly as possible. It behooves the president, and opponents of conflict with Iran, to remember that nothing about war removes the threat of uncertainty. Rather, most of the problems that exist before a strike against Iran will remain afterward, just in a much less predictable environment.
Dr. Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His interests include national security, military doctrine and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination. His weekly WPR column, Over the Horizon, appears every Wednesday.
BY ROBERT FARLEY
Source - WPR
The case for attacking Iran relies overwhelmingly on the concept of uncertainty. We don’t know if the Iranians want to build a bomb, or whether they can build a bomb, or when they might be able to build a bomb. Even if they build one, the consequences will remain unpredictable, because we don’t know what they would do with a bomb, or how their neighbors would react to an Iranian bomb. The deterrent effect of an Iranian nuclear weapon might prevent us from seeking regime change or some other aggressive military option, thus creating even more uncertainty. Containment might be possible, but the costs could be high and much would remain out of U.S. control.
It’s understandable how so much uncertainty can trigger anxiety. What is less clear is how we arrived at the notion that airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear program can eliminate this uncertainty. Prospects for success of an Israeli strike remain iffy, and U.S. estimates suggest that an attack would only briefly delay Iran’s nuclear program. Indeed, it\'s difficult to say what precisely would count as \"success\" or how the Israelis would measure the effectiveness of their attack. Tehran would certainly declare victory as soon as the last Israeli aircraft left its airspace, and the Iranians would control public assessment of the damage to their nuclear facilities.
Moreover, an Israeli strike on Iran, or a joint U.S.-Israeli strike, would hardly disarm the Islamic Republic. And once started, the war would end according to Tehran’s timetable, as Israel lacks the capability, and the United States the will or interest, to conquer Iran and replace the current regime. It is not certain that the regime of economic sanctions targeting Iran would break in case of an attack, but it’s certainly possible. Similarly, it’s not certain that Russia and China would become more forthcoming with military assistance to Tehran, but that, too, is certainly possible.
Most worrisome would be the prospect for the United States to be drawn into a war that it doesn’t want. Theoretically, the U.S. could wash its hands of an Israeli attack or adopt a stance of \"benevolent neutrality.\" However, the political costs of allowing Israel to absorb subsequent Iranian ripostes without coming to her aid might be too high to bear in an election year.
In short, an attack does nothing whatsoever to remedy uncertainty over the future of the Islamic Republic. Rather, on almost every available metric, an attack would enhance uncertainty, leaving all the players with less of a handle on the situation than they had before. Even if Israel and the United States eventually embrace “regime change” through airstrikes against Iranian government targets, the length, timing and extent of such a campaign could easily spiral out of control.
Right now, Iran is in a vise. Neither Russia nor China seems likely to expend much effort to support Tehran, and Europe appears ever more willing to commit to a robust sanctions program. Iran’s chief ally in the Middle East, Syria, is in the midst of a revolution. In conventional military terms, Iran is deeply inferior to its regional competitors and appears to be in the process of falling even farther behind. The Iranian defense budget amounts to roughly 60 percent of Israel’s, 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s, and 1 percent of America’s. Iran has displayed little ability to counter the strength of this undeclared trilateral coalition or to control regional events in any meaningful way.
In other words, war is not inevitable. Key people can still say no, with U.S. President Barack Obama being the most important among them. For now, the Obama administration seems to believe that pro-war rhetoric is manageable, and that it can tack between the demands of the Israeli government, the sanctions coalition and the presidential candidates of the Republican Party. This process involves pushing back against the idea that an immediate attack is necessary, while reaffirming the general idea that Iran represents a major threat to the United States.
As a political strategy, this may be viable. It runs the risk, however, of creating a rhetorical trap for the Obama administration. At some point, it may be hard for Obama to step down from the idea that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable and worth a war to prevent. In that case, saying no may become too politically difficult for the president. The task for hawks, whether in the United States or Israel, will be to draw this box as tightly and narrowly as possible. It behooves the president, and opponents of conflict with Iran, to remember that nothing about war removes the threat of uncertainty. Rather, most of the problems that exist before a strike against Iran will remain afterward, just in a much less predictable environment.
Dr. Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His interests include national security, military doctrine and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination. His weekly WPR column, Over the Horizon, appears every Wednesday.
BY ROBERT FARLEY
Source - WPR
